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Playing the Game of Democracy
Through the Electoral Mechanism: The
Democratic Party Experience in Turkey
GÜLİZ SÜTÇÜ
Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
ABSTRACT The commitment to the procedural rules of democracy, particularly to the elec-
toral mechanism, on the part of political leadership is considered necessary for the establish-
ment and survival of democracy. However, the political actors’ commitment to the electoral
mechanism does not guarantee the well-being of the democratic regime. In newly established
democracies, the electoral mechanism itself can also function as a disadvantage to democracy
if it is manipulated by the political elite. Based on this assumption, this article analyzes the case
of Turkey’s Democratic Party (DP, Demokrat Parti) under the leadership of Celal Bayar and
Adnan Menderes between 1946 and 60 and demonstrates that political actors can exploit the
electoral mechanism by either rescheduling elections or amending the electoral regulations
despite their acceptance of it as one of the basic procedural rules of democracy.
Introduction
The commitment on part of the political elite to democracy is crucial for its survival.
Moreover, it gains further importance in newly democratizing regimes due to the lack
of institutional and social elements. Nevertheless, in addition to the political elite’s
commitment to democracy, the procedural rules of democracy also become essential
for the survival of democracy regarding the fact that these rules can be manipulated
by the political elite despite its commitment to them.
The Democratic Party (DP) in Turkey illustrates this point to a great extent. With
the establishment of the DP on January 7, 1946, Turkey experienced transition to
democracy. Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes were two of the four founders of the
DP. Bayar was the first leader of the party, which was established as the strongest
opposition party to the Republican People’s Party (CHP, Cumhuriyetçi Halk
Partisi) of Ismet Inönü. In 1950, when the DP came to power, Bayar became the pre-
sident of Turkey. During his presidency from 1950 until the 1960 military interven-
tion, Menderes was both the leader of the DP and the Prime Minister. Hence, the
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assumption that the procedural rules of democracy can be manipulated by the political
elite in newly established democracies since the political leaders have not yet become
accustomed to democratic procedures can be tested through analyzing the DP experi-
ence in Turkey.
The article begins with a brief review of the literature on democratization and the
political elite and proceeds to discuss the DP case of Turkey. It analyzes the political
discourse and praxis of Bayar and Menderes concerning the electoral dimension of
the newly established Turkish democracy and concludes that political actors can
manipulate the electoral mechanism by either rescheduling elections or amending
the electoral regulations despite their acceptance of it as one of the basic procedural
rules of democracy.
Democratization and the Political Elite
Concerning the process of democratization, the literature suggests that the process is
comprised of several phases. The process starts with liberalization, continues with
transition, and terminates with consolidation.1 Liberalization refers to
. . .a mix of policy and social changes, such as less censorship of the media,
somewhat greater space for the organization of autonomous working-class
activities, the introduction of some legal safeguards for individuals. . . and
most important, the toleration of opposition.2
Transition refers to the collapse of the authoritarian regime and emergence of a demo-
cratic regime.3 In other words, the transition process is the process from the collapse
of the authoritarian regime to the birth of a democratic regime in which the govern-
ment comes to power with a free and popular vote and has the authority of policy
making without the intervention of other bodies.4 The next step, consolidation of
democracy, can be explained with “. . .the effective functioning of a democratic
regime”5 for which maintenance of rule of law, a free civil society, an autonomous
political society, constitutional rules to allocate power democratically, and a suffi-
ciently autonomous economy to assure pluralism of civil, political, and economic
societies is necessary.6
The agency approach explains the course of those processes through the role of
political leadership and introduces political agency as the decisive factor for the emer-
gence and survival of democracy. One of the leading scholars of the agency approach
is Dankwart A. Rustow, whose four-phase model is well-known. Rustow’s model
focuses on four respective phases of democratization: background condition, prepara-
tory phase, decision phase, and habituation phase.
Rustow takes national unity as the essential pre-condition since he maintains that it
is necessary for people to fully comprehend to which political community they
belong. He then focuses on the preparatory phase, arguing that democratization is
a dynamic process of uncertain struggle between political actors. He states that
































democracy, the struggle results in a compromise among the political leaders in favor
of democracy. Following such a compromise, negotiation between the political actors
then commences. Rustow defines this as the decision phase. After deciding upon the
procedures required to be followed in a democracy, the habituation phase begins
whereby leaders become accustomed to democratic procedures and consolidate
their commitment to the system. Thus, democracy emerges through a sequential
process “from national unity as background, through struggle, compromise, and
habituation to democracy” in which the political leaders are actively involved.7
Juan J. Linz, a very well-known political scientist, also argues for the agency
approach. Linz, like Rustow, focuses on political agents and perceives the political
process as based on political actors’ acts and decisions. He states that political
agency has implications not only for the democratization process, but also for demo-
cratic breakdown. In other words, for a regime that has recently experienced a tran-
sition from authoritarianism to democracy, it is essential to reflect on the impact of a
political leader managing and controlling the political process after the transition.8
Furthermore, political actors’ commitment and loyalty to the democratic system
itself are essential for democratic stability.9 In particular, their commitment to the pro-
cedural rules of democracy can be understood as crucial. In other words, these rules
such as free elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for office, and the like as intro-
duced by the minimalist conceptualization of democracy are crucial for the viability
of democracy.10
Yet, commitment to the procedural rules of democracy on the part of leadership is
not sufficient for the survival of the regime. The procedural rules of democracy can
also be exploited by the political actors, who consider them as the basic requirements.
The analysis of the electoral dimension in newly established democracies can explain
the manipulation of procedural rules by the political actors. While the political elites
in opposition can defend the electoral mechanism as the way to realize democracy,
they can exploit it either by rescheduling elections or amending the electoral regu-
lations for their own political interests when they come to power. Thus, in newly
democratizing regimes, it is much more possible for political leadership to manipulate
the procedural rules of democracy since the habituation phase has not yet been firmly
established.
This assumption that the procedural rules of democracy can be manipulated by the
political elite in newly democratizing regimes given the fact that the political leaders
have not yet become accustomed to procedural rules of democracy can be examined
through analyzing the DP in Turkey. Being the founders of the DP, Celal Bayar and
Adnan Menderes appeared as the prominent figures in the party. In addition to their
dominance within the DP, their impact on Turkish political life between 1946 and
1950 when forming the DP as the main opposition party and on the politics of the
period following the DP’s taking over the government from the CHP on May 14,
1950 until the breakdown of democracy on May 27, 1960 due to military intervention
was apparent.
Hence, the political discourse and praxis of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, con-
cerning the electoral mechanism of the newly democratizing regime of Turkey































presents a good case study. Since they formed the opposition between 1946 and 1950
and since Bayar was the President and Menderes was both the Prime Minister and the
head of the ruling party between the years 1950 and 1960, the DP case offers much to
the understanding of how the electoral mechanism is regarded by the political elite in
newly emerging democracies.
The DP’s Approach to the Electoral Mechanism in Opposition
The DP’s approach to the electoral mechanism in opposition became clear with the
developments during the years between 1946 and 1950. The DP was very active
during those years with the aim of improving the electoral system in Turkey. The
beginning point was the debate that began with the CHP government’s decision of
holding municipal elections earlier. This decision, which caused conflict between
the CHP government and the DP opposition, increased the DP’s efforts to amend
the election law in order to enable electoral security. Nevertheless, the newly
amended law that brought open ballot and secret counting did not suffice to
provide electoral security and the first general elections in the multi-party system,
which was held with this newly amended law, led to an endless debate attaching
attention to the importance of achieving electoral security. Hence, the debate on
the election law continued and the process resulted with the amendment of the law
to enable secret ballot and open counting.
Municipal Elections
The electoral system was one of the issues that both Bayar and Menderes, and thus the
DP concentrated upon. Since its establishment, the DP issued several declarations
concerning the electoral system. The first of these was witnessed with the CHP gov-
ernment’s decision to hold the municipal elections on May 26, 1946 instead of
holding elections four months later in September.11
The DP opposed the CHP’s decision. According to Menderes, who was the DP
spokesman at the time, the right decision would not be to hold early elections but
rather to postpone them, or at least to hold them on the date decided by the law. Men-
deres interpreted the CHP’s decision to precipitate the elections as stemming from its
desire not to allow sufficient time for the newly established DP to organize itself. He
thought that the decision to move the elections to an earlier date would not only have
a negative impact on the electoral turnout, but also would prevent the opposition from
getting prepared for the elections. Thus, two essential components of electoral com-
petition, the electorate and political parties, would not be able to play their roles as
they should have been able to in a democratic regime.
Menderes perceived the right to vote as the only mechanism available to explicitly
express the national will. Accordingly, he held that the democratization of elections
was mainly based on eliminating pressure and legal obstacles for political parties,
amending anti-democratic laws, and allowing political parties to prepare for elections.
































amendment aimed creating a semblance of democracy instead of bettering the demo-
cratic quality of the regime.12
Accordingly, with the parliament’s approval for holding the municipal elections
four months earlier, the DP decided to withdraw from the elections. This decision
was made public by Bayar in the beginning of May 1946. In his speech, reiterating
what Menderes had previously stated, Bayar emphasized that bringing the municipal
elections forward aimed to prevent the timely preparation of the DP and could also
result in early general elections.13 In addition to Bayar’s speech, this decision was
also announced through a written communiqué on May 8, 1946. The communiqué
stated that:
The DP finds the decision of the governing party to hold elections earlier as
running counter to the democratic mentality. Such decisions prevent rather
than serve democracy. In relation to this, participating in the elections would
be detrimental for the future of Turkish democracy. The DP therefore refuses
to take responsibility for such a mistake and will not participate in the
elections.14
Therefore, the communiqué also underscored the idea that bringing the municipal
elections forward could be a sign of the CHP’s intention to hold the general elections
earlier and thus, could in the end threaten the future of Turkish democracy.
New Election Law
During the debates related to the municipal elections, the draft law on the parliamen-
tary elections was presented to the Turkish Grand National Assembly on May 14,
1946 by the CHP. In the single-party era, parliamentary elections were held
through an indirect electoral system consisting of two phases. Voters from every elec-
toral district elected a certain number of members, who were thus authorized to
choose candidates for office. Hence, the elections were not direct and could not be
held in a single day. Besides, in the absence of an opposition party, supervision of
elections was also impossible. Regarding these, the CHP government explained the
rationale behind the draft as holding direct elections on a single day in the presence
of opposition party representatives functioning as observers during the counting of
votes to achieve electoral security.15
On this issue, Menderes presented the views of the DP. He expressed his approval
of the change toward the direct electoral system, as the change was a vital step toward
democracy. Additionally, he asserted that, in practice, the presence of only one
observing representative of the opposition party at each polling station would
change nothing. He argued that it would have been more meaningful to allow opposi-
tion party representatives to participate fully in the ballot station boards with the auth-
ority to supervise the elections and to keep minutes. He also stated that the current
laws were still far from meeting the needs of a democratic regime, especially since
although voting was open, vote counting was secret.16































Thus, Menderes defended the idea that, despite the positive changes it brought, the
bill on the election law should have been prepared with the goal of furthering elec-
toral security and thus, democratic character of the regime. While commenting that
certain changes introduced by the new election law would provide corporeal security,
he emphasized that these changes would not suffice to prevent spiritual pressure from
the government on the electorate. He conceded that even the implementation of
perfect laws could bring undesired consequences and therefore the spirit of the appli-
cation of the laws, as well as the integrity of individuals authorized to apply those
laws, was highly crucial.17
Following the parliamentary discussions, the bill on direct voting for parliamentar-
ians passed into law on June 5, 1946. With Law Number 4918, it was decided that the
elections would be held directly by open ballot and secret counting. Additionally, it
was decided that when the counting was over, the electoral ballots would be burned.18
First General Elections in the Multi-Party System
Following the ratification of the law, it was decided on June 10, 1946 to hold general
elections on July 21, 1946, one year earlier than had been planned.19 Upon this
decision, the DP realized that it could not make any changes in the situation by boy-
cotting the elections; thus, the DP decided to participate in the elections.20 It was
stated by Bayar that the DP had decided to participate in the elections for the sake
of the interests of the country.21 The DP leader Celal Bayar explained the DP’s
approach in a speech on June 29, 1946 in Adana:
. . .The country is ruled in accordance with the present law. We ask the people
to vote for the political party that they are in favor of. . .. The oppressors are
those who do not obey the national will, who are afraid of the national will.
By having the courage to participate in the elections within the framework of
the existing law, we will prove to them that obeying the national will is the
correct behavior.22
With this statement, Bayar emphasized the nature of the democratic regime and the
role of the electoral mechanism for the functioning of a democratic system. He
focused on the uncertainty of election results and interpreted it as the core of democ-
racy. Stressing the need for a legal framework in order to secure electoral freedom and
the integrity of the election results, he implied that accepting the election results con-
stituted the basic rationale behind the exercise of the electoral practice and that
holding elections was among the most fundamental practices of democracies.
The first direct elections in the multi-party system were held on July 21, 1946.
According to the official election results, the CHP won 85 percent of the votes,
while the DP won 13 percent, and the independents won the remaining 2 percent.
This meant 395 seats for the CHP, 64 seats for the DP, and six seats for the indepen-
































However, the results were contested as the elections were regarded by the DP as
corrupted. DP Party leader Celal Bayar blamed the government for the corrupt elec-
tions, stating:
I declare, I even accuse wickedness has interfered in the elections. The results
of the elections are far from indicating the real will of the nation. If the lawless
actions and various pressures imposed upon citizens had not reached such
levels our party would have won the elections all over the country. . .When
these pressures and lawless actions proved insufficient, the party in power
was forced to falsify the election records. . .Despite official announcements,
the nation chose the Democratic Party. The Republican Party is preserving
power only through the forceful methods it applied before and during the elec-
tions and thanks to the falsifications of election records.24
The DP’s objection to the results of the 1946 elections persisted in the following
days and the question of whether to participate in upcoming elections remained pro-
blematic. Accordingly, the amendments demanded in the election law with the aim of
providing electoral security were at the center of a continuous debate. Bayar summar-
ized the DP’s position on November 11, 1946:
There is almost no meeting during which the issue of election law and electoral
procedures is not on the agenda. I can clearly state that the elections are not in
the spirit of providing security to the country and the people. There cannot be a
greater mistake than to claim that the national will can be expressed in a country
in which there is no electoral security.25
Hence, Bayar equated the electoral mechanism with the security of the people and
the country. He considered that its improper functioning would threaten the security
of the country and the people. What Bayar argued was that the improper manifes-
tation of the national will to the parliament would lead to conflicts. In other words,
if there were a discrepancy between the demands of the people and the composition
of parliament, which would then not reflect the national will, conflicts among the
people that endangered the peace of the country would be inevitable.
As anticipated, the 1946 general elections were a lingering subject of debate of the
DP’s First Grand Congress held on January 7–11, 1947. During the Congress, Bayar
stated in his speech that he believed holding early elections was a reflection of the
CHP’s desire to secure the upcoming four years to its advantage. In the same
speech, he emphasized the need to secure principles of national sovereignty and to
eliminate all obstacles to democratic development.26
The points that Bayar concentrated upon were detailed in a report entitled
‘Freedom Pact’ (Hürriyet Misakı), to which Menderes contributed much.27 With
this document, the party clarified its position and perspective on the electoral mech-
anism.28 In the Pact, the need to amend the election law in order to secure the votes of
citizens and to conform to the principles of national sovereignty was heavily































emphasized.29 In accordance with those statements, the DP leadership declared its
ideas on the electoral system when Bayar emphasized the indispensability of
holding free and fair elections for achieving national sovereignty:
. . .the first requirement of democracy is free and fair elections with secret
voting. One cannot argue for the existence of national sovereignty in a
country, where the elections are not held freely and are subject to any kind
of material or even spiritual pressure.30
Hence, the DP leadership stressed at each opportunity the need for amending the elec-
tion law and of achieving the electoral security in order to assure exact expression of
the national will.
Debates Continuing on the Election Law
As the opposition persisted with its demands for more explicit promises and open
manifestations for the improvement of the Election Law, the debate on amending
the law in order to improve the quality of democracy was still on the agenda of the
political parties at the beginning of 1949. In Mersin, Bayar stated in relation to the
quality of democracy that:
I should say that we are still far from our democratic goals. Since some anti-
democratic laws are still in place, the security of elections has still not been
guaranteed, and practices based on an undemocratic spirit and understanding
are still prevalent.31
In line with Bayar, Menderes put forward his ideas. He argued that the country was in
a state of unrest. He related this unrest to the extended period of transition from the
single party system to the democratic system.32
As a response to the opposition, the CHP government submitted to the TBMM Pre-
sidency a draft on election law on December 16, 1949. It stated that:
In modern states, real rule by the people emerges with representative govern-
ment. Principles such as equality of voters, procedures for majority or pro-
portional representation, secret ballot, and open counting are required for the
election of representatives in any country that adopted the principle of democ-
racy. 33
According to the draft, parliamentary elections were to be direct and to be held by
secret ballot. In addition to those, open counting and judicial supervision were also
included among the changes.34 The draft on the parliamentary election law began
to be discussed in the TBMM on February 7, 1950 and the new election law enabling

































However, despite its support for the draft, the DP made several comments concern-
ing the draft. Menderes took the floor during the discussions on the draft of the par-
liamentary election law on February 16 and delivered a speech emphasizing the
importance of free and fair elections for the exact expression of national sovereignty.
He underscored the importance of an election law that would rule out any deception
and fraud in the elections and would prevent any pressure on the citizens. Neverthe-
less, he also declared that ratification of the election law would not be enough and that
the positive attitude observed during the preparation of the law should also be main-
tained during the elections.36 Therefore, the 1950 general elections were going to be
held directly and by secret ballot and open counting as regulated by the new election
law.
The DP’s Approach to the Electoral Mechanism in Government
As can be understood through its efforts to enable elections being held as scheduled
and to improve the electoral system for free and fair elections, when it was in opposi-
tion, the DP regarded holding elections timely and providing political competition on
an equal and safe ground as the core of Turkish democracy. Nevertheless, with its
becoming government, the DP either revised the schedule of elections or cancelled
them. Moreover, it also amended the election law several times to its own benefit.
At the end, the process resulted in the weakening of the electoral mechanism. This
led to the weakening of the whole political system and of Turkish democracy that
in the end collapsed due to the military intervention on May 27, 1960.
The DP Government Playing with the Electoral Schedule
With the newly amended election law, general elections were held on May 14, 1950.
The DP took 83.77 percent of the seats in the TBMM, while the CHP took only 14.16
percent.37 Hence, on May 22, 1950, the Assembly started its new term during which
Bayar was the President and Menderes was both the leader of the DP and the Prime
Minister of Turkey.
On May 29, 1950, Menderes delivered a speech on the governmental program. In
his speech, he emphasized that the people now could replace the government through
elections. In accordance with this, he articulated the democratic spirit of the new gov-
ernment when he stated: “it is the first time in our history that our parliament holds in
its hands the fate of the country as a result of the exact and free revelation of national
will.”38
However, Menderes’ interpretation of the exact manifestation of the national will
as an unquestionable power of the government resulted in the limitation of power of
the national will. The DP, once in power, started to either postpone and cancel elec-
tions or amend electoral regulations. The DP leadership, having formed the govern-
ment, began to enjoy the legitimacy that it had obtained through its electoral success.
Expecting no change in either the number of the seats of political parties in the
parliament or concerning the tense situation in the country, it revised the schedule































of elections. Having come to the government through fair and free elections and
with a great number of seats in the parliament, the DP now neglected the importance
of holding on-schedule elections, something the party had defended while in
opposition.
The case of by-elections was the DP’s first attempt to revise the schedule of elec-
tions. The DP decided to postpone the by-elections to the following year. Even
though the by-elections were scheduled to be held in 1950, the DP decided in its
meeting on July 4, 1950 to postpone them. The main argument behind its decision
was that holding by-elections would not change the composition of the Assembly.39
Since the DP took the parliament as an emanation of the national will, any elections
that would not have been influential on the constitution of the parliament seemed
useless to the DP. In other words, it approached the most elementary practice of a
democratic regime in a very non-principled way. Unsurprisingly, the opposition
reacted strongly to DP’s approach but the by-elections, which were due to be held
in the autumn of 1950, were postponed until September 16, 1951.40
Legal Amendments before and after the 1954 Elections
As mandated, the next general elections were to be held in 1954. During the meeting
of the DP Assembly Group, on February 11, 1954, following the approval of the elec-
tion date as May 2, 1954, Menderes claimed that there was need for some legal
changes to prevent any fraud in the elections,41 stating “elections are the most charac-
teristic manifestation of democratic life.”42 Accordingly, on February 17, 1954,
several articles of the Election Law (Number 5545) were amended. These amend-
ments covered crucial revisions such as a more detailed regulation of electoral regis-
ters and the formation of the ‘High Election Board’ (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) with the
authority to examine the election minutes.43
The parliamentary elections were held on May 2, 1954 with a high turnout of 88.63
percent. According to the results, the DP won 503 seats out of 541, while the CHP
only won 31 seats. The remaining seats were shared between the other opposition
party, the Republican National Party (CMP, Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi),44 and the
independents.45
Menderes interpreted the election results as the approval of the DP policies by the
entire population.46 Similarly, Bayar perceived the DP’s electoral success as the basis
of its legitimacy. Both understood democracy in terms of being in agreement with the
people; thus, they perceived the electoral mechanism to be the way through which
this agreement could be realized.47 Nevertheless, while the DP considered the prac-
tice of holding elections as sufficient for realizing democracy, it was observed that the
DP exploited the electoral mechanism by revising the electoral schedule and amend-
ing the electoral regulations.
With its legitimacy secured by its electoral success, the DP government revised the
election law. On June 30, 1954, the parliament enacted Law Number 6428, which
amended some articles of Law Number 5545. According to these revisions, the
































on the list of another political party or to become an independent candidate for a
different district was nullified. Additionally, the right of a candidate who was not
included on the party list to become a candidate of another political party or to
become an independent candidate was annulled. Some changes were also made to
the articles related to civil servants becoming candidates. It was now obligatory for
civil servants to resign six months before the elections in order to become candidates.
Furthermore, the right of political parties to present candidates with a joint list was
rendered void.48
These changes incensed the opposition, which interpreted these amendments as
restricting the right to vote. The CMP and the CHP declared their decision not to
take part in the local elections (elections for village headmen, provincial council
elections, and municipal elections) that were going to be held in September and
November 1955. The CMP stated that since the rule of law was not provided and
maintained by the government, it would not participate in the elections.49
The CHP stated that its belief in the possibility of holding free and fair elections
had greatly deteriorated. As to the reasons for its distrust in the government’s will
and ability to hold free and fair elections, the CHP pointed to the changes in the elec-
toral rules that prevented a free expression of national will.50
The decision of the opposition to boycott the elections was criticized severely by
the government. Menderes elaborated:
The current crisis is not to be found in the regime but in the morality in the
opposition. According to the CHP, while not participating in the elections in
1948 was equal to defaming the country in the eyes of the world and provoking
the people to rebellion by leading them off the legitimate path, today, according
to the CHP, the very same act is patriotic. . .51
He stated that the conditions under which elections were held were significantly
ameliorated. Furthermore, he recalled the differences between the conditions under
which the elections were held in the 1940s and in the 1950s. Accordingly, he
stated that the withdrawal from the elections that were going to be held under free
and fair circumstances was denying the legal way for competition.
However, the opposition did not change its mind and boycotted the elections.
Making its distrust clear toward the DP-led government like the DP had done
when in opposition, the opposition considered the idea of boycotting the elections
as a tool to prevent the DP government from exerting pressure on the opposition
parties and to make it reconsider its policies.52 Thus, in the absence of opposition,
the rate of turnout was recorded as around 40 percent in the local elections held in
September and November 1955.53
The DP Reamending the Election Law before the 1957 Elections
As the conflict between the DP government and the opposition continued, in 1957,
the CHP and the CMP attempted to form a coalition for the elections. However,































due to some amendments to the election law made by the government on the eve of
the 1957 general elections, the coalition conditions for the opposition parties became
extremely difficult.
With the amendments made on September 11, 1957, political parties were prohibited
from participating in the elections with a joint list of candidates. Additionally, political
parties were obliged to nominate a number of candidates equal to the number of depu-
ties to be elected in any given electoral district. If political parties did not conform to
this rule, they would be considered to have lost the elections in all electoral constitu-
encies. Furthermore, according to the law, one who had applied for candidacy to a par-
ticular political party would neither be allowed to be an independent candidate in
another electoral constituency nor a candidate of another political party. The law
also prohibited the nomination of a political party candidate if the individual had
belonged to another political party six months prior to the elections.54
Due to these amendments, the attempts of the opposition to cooperate in the 1957
elections became fruitless.55 Ismet Inönü, the first prime minister and the second pre-
sident of Turkey, now as the leader of the main opposition party, stated in Trabzon
that the CHP questioned the validity of participating in the elections under these
laws. However, he added that because of the CHP’s belief in the importance of the
electoral mechanism, the party had not decided to withdraw from the elections.56
On the following day, Inönü made another speech in Rize, where he stated that the
election law had been amended before the 1957 elections by the DP government
in order to prevent the DP from losing the elections and to prolong its stay in the
government.57
Hence, the elections were held amidst these debates on October 27, 1957. Accord-
ing to the election results, the DP won 424 seats, the CHP won 178 seats, the CMP
won four seats, and the Freedom Party (HP, Hürriyet Partisi) 58 won four seats.
Based on these results, it appeared that although the DP won the majority, it lost
some of its political support and the CHP had increased its votes.59
Considering the Rescheduling of the Elections and the 1960 Military Intervention
The DP’s loss of support and the opposition’s gain in strength allowed the opposi-
tion to increase its pressure on the government.60 As the severity of the opposition
increased, to defuse the tension in 1960, the DP decided to hold elections earlier.61
On October 2, 1959, Menderes attempted to justify his opinion for bringing the
elections forward with the assertion that, according to the results of a poll carried
out by the party, support for the party was higher in 1959 when compared to
1957.62 Upon this decision, on December 16, 1959, Menderes instructed the
party rank and file to begin and intensify the electoral campaign in areas where
support had been low in the 1957 elections.63 The opposition was expecting the
elections to be held in 1960 and İnönü expressed several times that this was his
understanding as well. 64
However, while Menderes defended the idea of holding elections considering that
































with the political opposition, Bayar defended the idea of not holding early elections
under the assumption that the elections would not produce a strong and legitimate
government. He argued that since the country was sliding into chaos due to the
severe opposition of the people and of the political parties to the DP government,
a governmental change under those circumstances would further the chaos.65
In light of Bayar’s and Menderes’ discussions on the idea of holding elections con-
sidering the government’s legitimacy, the DP government’s emphasis on the electoral
mechanism and the legitimacy provided due to the electoral victory were evident. It
was also clear in the speech Menderes delivered in Izmir just before the military inter-
vention, which was begun as the possible end of the crisis witnessed in the country
towards the end of the 1950s due to the civil and political unrest stemming from the
DP’s seeking for conflict resolution through severe measures and authoritarian sol-
utions. As the DP government resorted to authoritarian policies in order to defuse
the tension in the country, the relationship between the government and the opposi-
tion deteriorated further.
In his speech on May 15, 1960, Menderes criticized the attitude of the opposition
and argued that such an uncooperative attitude of the opposition closed the way
toward holding elections. More importantly, he stated that any attempt to eliminate
the electoral mechanism would equal an attempt to end democracy, thus clarifying
his understanding of the electoral mechanism as a requirement for the survival of
democracy.66 In the same speech, he exclaimed:
. . . If they (the opposition parties) have forgotten, they should learn that we
have been in government for ten years as a result of three elections. Moreover,
we are on the brink of new elections and in preparation for these elections.
Putting forward a deceitful statement to the effect that the elections would
not be held and basing rebellion and depravity upon such kind of statements
are the acts of those who do not have any trust in the election results, who
do not understand what democracy is, and who consider debilitating the
national will as the only foundation for their policies. . ..67
Nevertheless, despite Bayar’s and Menderes’ emphasis on electoral mechanism as
the only way of coming to power,68 the DP leadership, given its concern for gaining a
high rate of electoral support and forming a strongly legitimate government, aban-
doned the idea of holding elections in 1960.69 Therefore, even though resorting to
elections could have appeased the tension,70 the idea of holding early elections
was abandoned, and the crisis in the country could not be eased before the military
intervention, which ended civilian rule by dissolving the parliament on May 27, 1960.
Conclusion
Considering the analysis of the DP experience in Turkey in order to understand
whether the procedural rules of democracy can be exploited by the political elite
that is committed to these rules, it is apparent that Bayar and Menderes, as the































leading figures of the DP, placed great emphasis on the electoral dimension of democ-
racy. They spent effort to make the electoral regulations much more democratic when
the DP was in opposition. However, contrary to earlier efforts to democratize the elec-
toral system, due to the focus on legitimacy gained through elections, once in power,
the DP leadership did not hesitate to manipulate both the electoral schedule and the
electoral regulations.
Despite Bayar’s and Menderes’ faith in the importance of holding free and fair
elections in democracies, since they perceived the election results to be the only
factor on which governmental power and legitimacy were based, while in opposition
they boycotted the municipal elections held in May 1946 and questioned boycotting
the July 1946 general elections in order to put the legitimacy of the CHP government
under question. They considered that due to the lack of the opposition’s participation
in the elections, the election results would not truly reflect the national will; thus, the
legitimacy of the government would remain weakened.
Nevertheless, once the DP formed the government, again in accordance with its
emphasis on election results and legitimacy of the government, the DP’s election
victory was the basis on which the DP justified its position for manipulating the elec-
toral mechanism itself. In several instances, the DP leadership discussed changing the
schedule of elections. Furthermore, the DP government amended the election law
several times, neglecting the position and demands of the opposition necessary to
be considered for the safety of a democratic regime.
Hence, the DP regarded the electoral mechanism as a fundamental principle of
democracy. From the establishment of the DP in 1946 until the military intervention
in 1960, the DP consistently expressed its commitment to the electoral mechanism
and never opted to abolish the electoral mechanism. However, while the DP accepted
the electoral mechanism as the basic procedure of democracy, the DP government
altered the electoral schedule and the regulations to its own benefit. As a result,
this stance led to the deterioration of the electoral mechanism itself and thus, of
the democracy, which in the end collapsed due to the military intervention on May
27, 1960.
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18. Tarhan Erdem, Anayasalar ve Seçim Kanunları (1876-1982) [Constitutions and Election Laws] (İstan-
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1956), pp. 443–6.
22. Vatan, June 30, 1946.
23. Cumhuriyet, July 25, 1946.
24. Karpat (1959), pp. 164–5.
25. Nazmi Sevgen, Celal Bayar Diyor ki 1920-1950 [Celal Bayar Narrates] (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası,
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(İstanbul: Truva, 2004), pp. 103–5.
48. TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Term: 10, Vol. 1, p. 42.
49. Ulus, August 4, 1955.
50. Ulus, August 6, 1955.
51. Zafer, August 11, 1955.
52. Karpat (1959), p. 186.
53. Feroz Ahmad, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Politikanin Açıklamalı Kronolojisi 1945-1971 [Annotated
Chronology of Multi-Party Politics in Turkey] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1976), pp. 141–3.
54. Erdem (1982), pp. 249–50.
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57. Ibid, p. 132.
58. On December 20, 1955, the Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi; HP) was officially founded by the DP
party members being expelled or having resigned following the unease within the party.
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65. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Menderes’in Dramı 1899-1960 [The Drama of Menderes] (İstanbul: Remzi,
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